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AUDITOR PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENT NARCISSISM  
AS A FRAUD ATTITUDE RISK FACTOR 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Auditing standards prescribe that the auditor should consider client management’s 
attitude toward fraud when making fraud risk assessments. However, little guidance is provided 
in the auditing standards or the existing fraud literature on observable indicators of fraud attitude. 
We test whether observable indicators of narcissism, a personality trait linked to unethical and 
fraudulent behavior, is viewed by auditors as an indicator of increased fraud attitude risk. We 
administered an experiment to 101 practicing auditors from one international public accounting 
firm who assessed fraud risk based on a scenario in which client manager narcissism (attitude) 
and fraud motivation were each manipulated at two levels (low and high). Our results show that 
narcissistic client behavior and fraud motivation are significantly and positively related to 
auditors’ overall fraud risk assessments. Implications of these findings for further research and 
the auditing profession are discussed. 
 
Keywords: fraudulent financial reporting; attitude/rationalization; risk assessment; narcissism. 
 
Data Availability: contact the authors.  
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AUDITOR PERCEPTIONS OF CLIENT NARCISSISM  
AS A FRAUD ATTITUDE RISK FACTOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fraudulent financial reporting continues to be a serious concern, despite the increased 
emphasis on fraud detection in the auditing standards since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (Hogan et al. 2008).
1
  Auditing standards related to fraud incorporate the fraud 
triangle, a conceptual framework that links the three elements believed to give rise to fraud: (1) 
motivation, pressure, or incentive; (2) opportunity; and (3) attitudes, set of values, or personal 
characteristics.
2
 Auditing standards include specific examples of fraud risk factors (red flags) for 
each of the fraud triangle elements, but note the inherent difficulty of identifying fraud attitude 
risk factors. 
Behavioral traits consistent with narcissism exhibited by client managers may provide 
observable indications to auditors of increased fraud risk related to attitude.
3
 Narcissism is a 
personality construct that defines an individual’s self-concept in terms of an exaggerated sense of 
self-importance, fantasies of unlimited success or power, need for admiration, and lack of 
empathy. Although moderate levels of narcissism can be beneficial (Maccoby 2003), more 
extreme narcissism has been linked to unethical or fraudulent behavior (Blickle et al. 2006; 
Williams et al. 2010). Recent research in accounting suggests that narcissism is consistent with 
observed attitudes and behaviors in recent major frauds (Cohen et al. 2010). Other research has 
found associations between observed indicators of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) narcissism 
                                                 
1
 In this paper the term “fraud” refers exclusively to fraudulent financial reporting. 
2
 Current professional standards on the assessment of fraud risk include: (1) International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) International Standard on Auditing 240, The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud 
in an Audit of Financial Statements (IAASB 2009); (2) Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) AU 
Section 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit  (PCAOB 2012); and (3) American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) AU-C Section 240, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit 
(AICPA 2011). 
3
 Emmons (1984) reports on three studies that tested the construct validity of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
(NPI) and finds that peer observations of narcissistic traits are strongly positively correlated to the NPI score. 
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and risky or fraudulent actions undertaken by the CEO’s firm (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 
2011; Aktas et al. 2012; Schrand and Zechman 2012). Indicators of narcissism among executives 
and those charged with governance also has been linked to a lax or dysfunctional “tone at the 
top” of the organization (Salter 2008; Amernic and Craig 2010; Craig and Amernic 2011; Zona 
et al. 2012). If observed narcissistic traits by client managers are reliable indicators of fraud 
attitude risk, auditors should identify these traits as fraud attitude red flags and incorporate this 
information into their fraud risk judgments (Hammersley 2011).  
Despite the potential significance of observable fraud attitude traits, comparatively little 
audit research into attitude-related elements of fraud risk has been conducted to date (Hogan et 
al. 2008). One reason advanced to explain the lack of research into fraud attitude in audit risk 
judgments is the difficulty in both observing and operationalizing attitude in a research setting 
(Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Allen et al. 2006; Hernández and Groot 2006; Carcello and 
Hermanson 2008; Carpenter et al. 2011; Murphy and Dacin 2011; Murphy 2012). The primary 
objective of this exploratory study, therefore, is to evaluate whether auditors at various 
experience levels are able to 1) recognize characteristics indicative of narcissism exhibited by 
client personnel and 2) link observed client narcissism to increased fraud attitude risk. If so, 
these results would provide evidence that auditors are able to recognize a specific attitudinal 
characteristic, potentially associated with unethical and fraudulent management behavior, as an 
indication of increased fraud risk. 
One hundred and one practicing auditors from one international public accounting firm, 
representing all experience levels from staff to partner, participated in the study. In a quasi-
experimental setting, client narcissism and fraud motivation were manipulated between subjects 
at two levels (high and low). Our results indicate that auditor assessments of fraud risk are 
significantly higher when auditors observe client manager behavior and attitudes that are 
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consistent with narcissism. Higher motivation to commit fraud also was related to higher auditor 
assessments of fraud risk. A post-experimental questionnaire administered to managers and 
partners from the participating public accounting firm confirmed that experienced auditors do 
interpret high levels of client manager narcissism as a significant fraud attitude risk indicator.  
This study contributes to the auditor fraud judgment literature by incorporating an 
observable measure of fraud attitude into auditor fraud risk assessments. Further, these results 
suggest that auditors respond to client narcissism as a significant fraud risk factor, consistent 
with research in psychology, business, and accounting that has linked manager narcissism with 
dysfunctional or fraudulent corporate conduct. Finally, auditor awareness of narcissism as a 
fraud attitude indicator should translate into greater understanding of the potential impact of 
narcissistic client leadership on the organization’s control environment, ethical climate, and 
“tone at the top.” 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we discuss 
the psychological characteristics of narcissism, how narcissism is linked to fraud attitude, and the 
development of a research hypothesis and research question. Next, we describe the research 
design and development of our experimental materials. We then present our statistical model and 
experimental results. The paper concludes with a discussion of the results and limitations of the 
study, along with implications for current auditing practice and future research.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Narcissism as a Personality Characteristic  
In a comprehensive analysis of narcissism, Morf and Rhodewalt (2001, 177) describe the 
narcissistic personality as follows: 
[A] pervasive pattern of grandiosity, self-focus, and self-importance… narcissists 
are preoccupied with dreams of success, power, beauty, and brilliance. They live 
on an interpersonal stage with exhibitionistic behavior and demands for attention 
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and admiration but respond to threats to self-esteem with feelings of rage, 
defiance, shame, and humiliation. In addition, they display a sense of entitlement 
and the expectation of special treatment. They are unwilling to reciprocate the 
favors of others and are unempathetic and interpersonally exploitative. 
 
Researchers in psychology distinguish between clinical narcissism (a personality disorder) and 
trait narcissism. Trait narcissism is viewed as a relatively stable personality characteristic that is 
normally distributed in the adult population (Foster and Campbell 2007; Miller and Campbell 
2010). In interpersonal contexts, trait narcissism serves as both a personality trait and as a self-
regulatory mechanism, wherein the narcissist’s motivations, relationships with others, and self-
regulatory strategies interact to drive behavior (Campbell et al. 2011).  In contrast with clinical 
narcissism, there is no recognized cutoff point for trait narcissism between “normal” and 
“excessive” levels (Miller and Campbell 2010).4  
Elevated levels of narcissism are associated with an inflated sense of one’s importance 
and capabilities (grandiosity), and the need to have these beliefs constantly reinforced (Campbell 
et al. 2004b). A narcissist with strong grandiose tendencies is obsessed with obtaining, or 
creating if necessary, positive feedback from others (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001). However, if 
such feedback is withheld, such as in the face of failure, the narcissist responds with extreme 
displays of negative emotion (Horowitz and Arthur 1988; Bushman and Baumeister 1998; 
Rhodewalt and Morf 1998) and deflection of blame to others (Kernis and Sun 1994; Stucke and 
Sporer 2002). Narcissistic grandiosity includes a strong self-enhancement dimension (Paulhus 
and Williams 2002), making it a highly observable trait by others.  
Another key element of elevated narcissism is entitlement, which is manifested 
interpersonally as a sense of superiority compared to others (Brown et al. 2009). Campbell et al. 
(2004a) conceptualize entitlement as a pervasive sense that the entitled individual deserves more, 
                                                 
4
 For ease of exposition, the term “narcissism” refers to trait narcissism in the remainder of the paper. 
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in both rewards and recognition, compared to others. In a series of experiments across multiple 
settings, Campbell et al. (2004a) found significant associations between entitlement and a variety 
of self-serving behaviors. Entitlement has also been linked to interpersonal exploitativeness of 
others for personal gain or to reinforce the power relationship between the narcissist and others 
whom the narcissist believes are less worthy (Corry et al. 2008; Reidy et al. 2008). 
Dysfunctional Aspects of Narcissism 
Moderate levels of narcissism are associated with such positive personal characteristics as 
confidence and decisiveness (Kets de Vries and Miller 1985; Maccoby 2003). Elevated levels of 
narcissism, however, lead to dysfunctional or destructive interpersonal relations and outcomes 
(Lubit 2002; Maccoby 2003; Kets de Vries 2004). For example, the constant need for admiration 
rooted in narcissism may drive the narcissist to take excessive risks (Wallace and Baumeister 
2002; Vazire and Funder 2006; Foster et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2010). Similarly, narcissism 
can lead to unethical behaviors when the narcissist believes that (s)he is deserving of greater 
rewards than can be obtained ethically (Brown et al. 2009; Brunell et al. 2011), or when the 
narcissist’s ego is threatened by real or perceived competition (Campbell et al. 2004a; Davis et 
al. 2008). 
High levels of narcissism are also associated with low personal integrity (Schlenker 2008). 
Elevated narcissism has been empirically linked to academic cheating (Brown et al. 2009; 
Williams et al. 2010; Brunell et al. 2011) and research misconduct (Mumford and Helton 2002; 
Davis et al. 2008). Blickle et al. (2006) reported that a sample of white-collar criminals scored 
significantly higher on a standard narcissism scale compared to a group of non-criminals with 
similar professional backgrounds. 
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Manager Narcissism and Corporate Performance  
Recent research in organizational psychology and business has linked observable 
measures of CEO narcissism (e.g., higher compensation levels, size and placement of the CEO’s 
photograph in annual reports, and frequency of self-references in shareholder letters) with risky 
and negative consequences to the organization. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007, 2011) 
demonstrated that higher levels of CEO narcissism are associated with extreme and volatile 
corporate financial performance, and that narcissistic CEOs are less responsive to objective 
measures of negative corporate performance. Other research has linked executive- and board-
level narcissism with less effective corporate governance, including a lax or unduly aggressive 
“tone at the top” that may facilitate organizational misconduct (Salter 2008; Amernic et al. 
2010). 
Evaluation of the effects of manager narcissism is a recent area of focus in accounting 
research as well. In an experimental economics context, Hales et al. (2011) found a positive 
association between manager narcissism and aggressive financial reporting. Aktas et al. (2012) 
examined CEO narcissism effects in merger and acquisition activity and found less favorable 
shareholder reaction to takeover announcements and lower probability of deal completion when 
the acquiring and/or target organization CEOs were more narcissistic. In two studies that focused 
on financial reporting fraud as documented in SEC Audit and Accounting Enforcement Releases 
(AAERs), Rijsenbilt (2011) found a significant association between reported fraud and a 
multidimensional measure of CEO narcissism, while Schrand and Zechman (2012) observed 
significantly higher levels of CEO compensation (as a proxy for higher CEO narcissism) in fraud 
versus non-fraud AAERs. Olsen et al. (2012) reported that the prominence and placement of the 
CEO’s photograph in annual reports (a measure of narcissism used by Chatterjee and Hambrick 
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2007) was positively related to earnings per share, share price, and audit fees in a sample of 
Fortune 500 companies from 1992-2009. 
Fraud Attitude and Auditor Fraud Risk Assessments 
Fraud attitude is defined in the auditing standards as a mindset, set of ethical standards, or 
rationalization that justifies the commission of fraud. Although auditing standards emphasize the 
critical importance of attitude in assessing fraud risk, existing standards acknowledge the 
inherent difficulty of observing red flags associated with increased fraud attitude risk, and 
consequently provide few specific examples of management attitudes, values, or personal 
characteristics that would assist the auditor in assessing the risk of fraud based on these factors. 
In an early study of audit fraud indicators (red flags), Albrecht and Romney (1986) found 
that such attitude-related elements as dishonesty, lack of ethics, and low moral character among 
top managers were considered to be significant fraud risk factors by auditors. Loebbecke et al. 
(1989, 19) identified two factors related to personal integrity, moral fiber and personality 
anomalies, as audit fraud indicators. Turner et al. (2003) concluded that management integrity is 
a key element of fraud attitude in the auditor’s fraud risk assessment. 
Empirical research on fraud attitude indicates that auditors are cognizant of the potential 
for increased fraud risk when management’s attitude suggests a lack of integrity. Bell and 
Carcello (2000) proposed a predictive model of fraud in which dishonest or evasive management 
was a significant fraud risk indicator. Beaulieu (2001) found evidence of a negative relationship 
between perceived client integrity and audit effort. Kizirian et al. (2005) found that management 
integrity impacts risk assessments and corresponding audit scope. In a scenario-based study, 
Gillett and Uddin (2005) surveyed 139 chief financial officers (CFOs) regarding the likelihood 
of committing fraud. They found that CFOs’ fraud intentions were linked to their attitudes 
toward fraudulent financial reporting and concluded that auditors’ assessments of management 
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attitudes based on personal contact could serve as fraud indicators. In a study of over 5,600 audit 
engagements by one Big 4 firm in the Netherlands, Hernández and Groot (2006) provide 
evidence that audit partners respond to lower assessments of client integrity with increased fraud 
risk assessments during audit planning. 
Fraud Attitude Hypothesis 
Prior research in psychology and accounting suggests that characteristics consistent with 
narcissism likely increase fraud risk. Further, Hammersley’s (2011) model of auditor fraud risk 
assessment identifies motivation, opportunity, and attitude factors as general fraud risk indicators 
which, when combined with client- or engagement-specific red flags, suggest an elevated risk of 
fraud. Auditors then generate specific fraud hypotheses, assess fraud risk based on these 
hypotheses, and modify the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures to reflect the assessed 
level of fraud risk.  
Based on Hammersley’s (2011) auditor fraud risk assessment model, auditors should 1) 
identify narcissistic personality cues and behaviors by a client manager as fraud attitude red 
flags, 2) consider how these observed cues and behaviors could result in specific fraudulent 
actions by the manager, and 3) incorporate both the manager’s elevated fraud attitude and the 
increased potential for fraudulent actions into higher fraud risk assessments. Accordingly, we 
predict that auditors will associate higher perceived client manager narcissism with higher 
assessments of fraud risk. This prediction is formally stated as our research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: An auditor will assess the risk of fraud to be higher when a client 
manager exhibits behavior and attitudes consistent with high levels of narcissism.  
 
Interaction of Narcissism with Motivation and Opportunity to Commit Fraud 
Recent research suggests that the three elements of the fraud triangle interact in 
determining fraud risk. Desai et al. (2010) examined management’s propensity to make 
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opportunistic accounting choices under varying combinations of high and low pressure 
(motivation) and opportunity, controlling for individual differences in managers’ predispositions 
to rationalize their choices (i.e., a measure of fraud attitude). Desai et al. (2010) found a 
significant interaction between rationalization and opportunity in management’s accounting 
choices. Other research has examined interactions among fraud triangle elements in auditor fraud 
risk assessments. In an evidential modeling study, Turner et al. (2003) demonstrated significant 
interactions between auditors’ evaluations of management integrity (fraud attitude) and both 
opportunity and motivation, concluding that low management integrity (high attitude risk) not 
only increased assessments of fraud risk directly, but could motivate management to create 
additional opportunities and incentives for fraud, further increasing assessed levels of fraud risk. 
Hernández and Groot (2006) reported that fraud motivation factors (i.e., incentive pay schemes) 
significantly influenced auditor fraud risk assessments only when management integrity was 
high (i.e., fraud attitude risk was low). Conversely, Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and Favere-
Marchesi (2009) demonstrated that auditor sensitivity to fraud motivation cues was unaffected by 
the level of fraud attitude risk. 
Based on our primary focus on narcissism and the mixed results of prior research, we do 
not advance specific hypotheses for fraud motivation or its interaction with narcissism on fraud 
risk assessments.
5
  Rather, we propose the following research question (RQ) with respect to 
fraud motivation and its relationship with narcissism: 
RQ: Does level of fraud motivation influence auditors’ fraud risk assessments 
interactively across low and high levels of client manager narcissism?           
 
                                                 
5
 We initially planned to examine the effects of both motivation and opportunity on fraud risk assessments in 
addition to narcissism. However, our initial analysis of the data indicated that fraud opportunity was not 
significantly associated with auditor fraud risk assessments.  Accordingly, opportunity was eliminated from further 
analysis, and all subsequent tests examined narcissism and fraud motivation effects only. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
Experimental Materials, Participants, and Data Collection 
We developed an audit judgment case scenario that included specific indications of client 
fraud attitude (narcissistic traits) and fraud motivation. Narcissism and motivation were each 
manipulated at two levels (high or low) in a 2 x 2 design. The client manager in the case scenario 
is the general manager of a significant business unit within a commercial construction company.
6
   
Data were collected in a quasi-experimental setting, where participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the four possible experimental conditions and individually completed the 
experimental materials. Participants were 101 practicing auditors from several U.S. offices of a 
large international public accounting firm. Responses were gathered through a combination of 
(1) “live” administration at firm training events attended by the researchers and (2) mail 
responses, where the managing partners of four firm offices agreed to distribute the 
questionnaires and coordinate their completion and return. All mail responses were returned on a 
timely basis, with the majority received from one large office in a single mailing three weeks 
after delivery. Approximately 80 percent of the responses were collected during the live 
sessions.
7
 Participants represented all levels of experience (staff, senior, manager, senior 
manager, and partner). Demographic information for participants is shown in Table 1.
8
 Because 
prior research and our participating audit firm include auditors with all experience levels in the 
                                                 
6
 We selected the commercial construction industry for the case scenario setting because it is an industry generally 
familiar to external auditors. This setting allowed the inclusion of several common industry operating risk factors 
(e.g., complex contract accounting, project delays, construction lending) in addition to the seeded fraud risk factors  
7
 Responses from live administration were compared to those returned by mail. No differences were noted in any 
experimental responses or demographic variables between the two administration methods. 
8
 None of the demographic variables were significantly related to the experimental factors or dependent measure 
responses in the primary data analysis. 
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fraud risk assessment process during audit planning, we believe the wide range of audit 
experience levels of participants is appropriate for our experimental task.
9
     
Insert Table 1 here 
 This study is an initial examination of client narcissism as a fraud attitude risk factor in 
an audit context. Thus we believe that the experimental task and setting and the experience levels 
of the participants are appropriate given the exploratory nature of the research. Having 
participants assess fraud risk individually, rather than in an engagement team discussion setting, 
allows us to focus on the individual-level influences of our narcissism variable on audit fraud 
risk. Recent research on audit team fraud “brainstorming” (e.g., Carpenter 2007; Brazel et al. 
2010) indicates that individual auditors’ fraud risk identification and responses are generally 
reflected in overall audit team fraud risk judgments.  
Motivation Manipulations 
The case manipulated fraud motivation in two ways. First, the future of the business unit 
was (was not) described as dependent on the client manager securing future profitable business 
in the high (low) fraud motivation condition. Second, the unit’s reported financial performance 
on a current project for a large customer was (was not) linked to the likelihood of obtaining 
lucrative additional business from the customer in the high (low) fraud motivation condition.
10
 
Narcissism Manipulation 
We based our narcissism manipulation on an analysis of selected items from the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) by Raskin and Hall (1979). The NPI is the most 
commonly used scale to measure narcissism in business research (Hales et al. 2011). We focused 
                                                 
9
 Carpenter (2007) included manager-, senior-, and staff-level auditors from the Big 4 firms in her study of audit 
team fraud risk “brainstorming.” Discussions with partners and managers from the participating audit firm in our 
study confirmed that their firm’s current practice is to include audit team members from all experience levels (staff 
through partner) in the fraud risk assessment process during engagement planning. 
10
 The motivation manipulations are similar to those used in prior fraud risk assessment research (Webber et al. 
2006). 
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on NPI items that best matched up with the narcissism constructs of grandiosity and 
entitlement/exploitativeness. In the case scenario, we included a dialogue between the auditor 
(the participant) and the client manager that included (in the high narcissism condition) or did 
not include (in the low narcissism condition) conversational cues by the manager that were 
consistent with these narcissism constructs. For example, in the high-narcissism condition, the 
manager’s attitude and demeanor as part of the dialogue with the auditor reflected grandiosity (“I 
make sure things get done on time, and let me tell you, it’s not always easy”), entitlement (“My 
staff is small, and I keep them plenty busy”), and exploitativeness (“I told my staff that they had 
better follow my procedures to the letter from now on or heads would roll”).  
In addition, the high narcissism treatment condition included numerous first-person 
references (“I,” “me”) by the manager in the dialogue with the auditor. First-person references 
are consistently associated with high narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, 2011; Raskin 
and Shaw 1988). We also included in the high narcissism dialogue a self-description of the 
manager’s tendency to react with anger to an ego threat, which is another characteristic of high 
narcissism (Rhodewalt and Morf 1998; Stucke and Sporer 2002). The low narcissism condition 
dialogue did not include either first-person references or an emotional reaction by the manager.
11
 
Excerpts from the research instrument are shown in the Appendix. 
Dependent Measure 
The dependent measure to elicit the overall fraud risk assessment was worded as follows: 
Overall, I believe the risk of fraud in [the business unit] is…. 
                                                 
11
 The narcissism manipulations were pilot tested by approximately 120 senior undergraduate and master’s-level 
accounting students as well as auditors from several large public accounting firms, resulting in minor modifications 
to the wording of our measures. 
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Responses to the fraud risk assessment question were measured on a seven-point scale, with 
endpoint labels of 1 = “very low” and 7 = “very high.”  The scale midpoint of 4 was labeled 
“moderate.”  
Narcissism Manipulation Checks 
 After reading the case and making their fraud risk assessments, participants responded to 
a number of statements pertaining to their perceptions of the general manager’s personal traits. 
Participants responded to each statement on a seven-point scale where 1 = “strongly agree,” 4 = 
“neutral,” and 7 = “strongly disagree.” Example statements included descriptions of the manager 
as “demands respect,” “has a high opinion of himself,” and “is even-tempered” (reverse-scored). 
Statements unrelated to narcissism also were included to disguise the nature of the manipulation 
check task. For the narcissism-related statements, t-tests of mean differences (not tabulated) 
indicated that responses of participants in the high-narcissism reflected significantly higher 
perceived narcissism compared to those of participants in the low-narcissism condition (p < 
.001). 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The effects of the experimental treatments for client manager narcissism and fraud 
motivation were evaluated in a 2 (high/low narcissism)  2 (high/low motivation) between-
subjects factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA), the results of which are shown in Table 2.
 12
 
Insert Table 2 here 
                                                 
12
 We also considered several other variables as controls in the model, including total audit experience, number of 
frauds encountered as an auditor, and responses to the primary narcissism manipulation check (“the manager has a 
high opinion of himself”). None of the potential control variables were significant; thus only the two fraud risk 
factors (narcissism and motivation) were included in the final model. 
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Narcissism and Motivation Effects on Fraud Risk Assessments  
Both client narcissism and fraud motivation were significantly related to audit fraud risk 
assessments. Participants in the high narcissism condition assessed mean fraud risk as 
significantly higher compared to those in the low narcissism condition (5.212 versus 4.410; F = 
16.689; p < .001). The significant narcissism effect supports our research hypothesis. 
The effect of fraud motivation also was significant, where participants in the high 
motivation condition indicated higher mean fraud risk compared to those in the low motivation 
condition (5.011 versus 4.612; F = 4.130; p = .045).  However, the narcissism x motivation 
interaction was not significant, indicating that the motivation effect was consistent across both 
levels of narcissism (RQ1). 
Supplemental Analysis 
In order to confirm the intended fraud attitude effect of narcissism and obtain a more 
detailed understanding of how auditors interpret client narcissism, we administered a post-
experimental questionnaire to eight highly experienced auditors (two managers, four senior 
managers, and two partners) from the participating public accounting firm.
13
 Audit experience 
among this group ranged from six to 25 years (mean = 12.75 years). All participants agreed in 
advance to respond to the questionnaire by e-mail.  
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we asked participants to identify additional client 
personality traits suggestive of higher fraud attitude risk and provide open-ended explanations 
for their choices. Among the additional traits identified were ostentatious, sensitive to criticism, 
arrogant, and dismissive, all of which are consistent with trait narcissism. One session 
                                                 
13
 Although some auditors who participated in the post-experimental sessions had also participated in either the pilot 
study or the final experiment, the post-experimental sessions took place several months after the experiment 
administration. Thus the risk of carryover effects from the experiment to the post-experimental session results was 
considered remote. Further, we observed no differences between post-experimental responses based on earlier study 
participation.  
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participant commented on two specific fraud risks posed by a narcissistic client manager as 
follows: 
“A manager with little tolerance for error indicates a higher fraud risk given this 
may be an indication unreasonable deadlines are being made on client staff. If 
deadlines are unreasonable, staff may rationalize that it is better to fraudulently 
complete their work rather than being subject to the negative feedback of the 
manager.” 
 
“A manager’s actions to take credit for success and blame others for failure cause 
undue pressure on his staff. Such pressure could cause staff to rationalize that 
fraudulent or unethical acts are appropriate if they help them to avoid unfair 
blame from the manager.” 
 
These open-ended responses are consistent with auditors considering client narcissism as a 
specific fraud attitude risk factor. More importantly, they provide evidence that auditors link 
observed client fraud attitude characteristics (narcissism) and specific potentially fraudulent 
client actions triggered by these attitudes. 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our study contributes to the auditor fraud risk assessment literature by demonstrating a 
link between indications of client narcissism and auditor fraud risk assessments. We are not 
aware of any published study that has examined auditor fraud risk judgments based on specific 
client attitude factors consistent with narcissism. Based on prior research in organizational 
psychology and management, we predicted that high levels of narcissism exhibited by a client 
manager would be interpreted by auditors as consistent with an attitude or set of ethical values 
that would allow the manager to rationalize fraud. The results indicate a narcissism effect, with 
significantly higher assessments of fraud risk when a client manager was described as exhibiting 
narcissistic characteristics. Results of post-experimental questionnaires administered to eight 
experienced auditors (managers, senior managers, and partners) from the participating public 
accounting firm reinforce these findings. In addition, auditors assessed fraud risk as significantly 
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higher in the presence of motivations for the client manager to commit fraud. However, 
narcissism did not interact with fraud motivation in influencing auditor fraud risk judgments. 
This suggests that, in our experimental setting, high levels of either fraud attitude risk or fraud 
motivation risk were sufficient to increase auditors’ fraud risk assessments.  
The results of this exploratory examination offer initial evidence that manager narcissism 
is an observable measure of elevated fraud attitude risk. More research regarding the specific 
aspects of narcissism and how these influence unethical or fraudulent conduct by managers and 
organizations is clearly warranted. In addition, research that examines in more detail the 
combined effects of narcissism, motivation, and opportunity will likely provide insights into how 
fraud attitude influences, or is influenced by, the motivation and opportunity to commit fraud. 
Further, narcissism is related to two other similar but distinct personality traits, psychopathy and 
Machiavellianism, which together are known as the “Dark Triad” of dysfunctional or destructive 
personal characteristics (Paulhus and Williams 2002; Lee and Ashton 2005). Research that 
examines the similarities and differences in fraud attitude effects based on observable traits from 
all three “Dark Triad” characteristics will increase our understanding of the role of client 
personality on fraud attitude risk. 
This study is subject to certain limitations. First, the experimental materials reflect one 
scenario in one industry and one specific operationalization of high and low fraud attitude and 
motivation. Second, our experimental procedures did not involve any group interaction in 
recognizing and evaluating fraud risk indicators as required by professional standards. Third, 
because our respondents represented only one large international public accounting firm, we 
cannot address whether inter-firm differences in fraud risk assessment training or procedures 
might have influenced the results.  
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These findings have implications for audit practice. The results suggest that auditors are 
aware of the link between client narcissism and increased fraud attitude risk. Public accounting 
firms should emphasize the linkage between specific client manager personality traits (including 
narcissism) and the increased likelihood of fraud-related behaviors in fraud risk assessment 
training. In addition, these findings may be useful to standard setters and auditing firms as a 
means to improve professional guidance regarding how to assess fraud attitude and the resulting 
effect on auditors’ fraud risk assessments. 
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Table 1 
Participant Demographic Information 
(n = 101) 
 
Variable 
 
Mean age (years) 29.8 
Gender (percent male) 57.4% 
Mean audit experience (months) 73.7 
  
Number (percent) of participants by professional rank   
Staff 28 (27.7%) 
Senior 32 (31.7%) 
Manager 20 (19.8%) 
Senior Manager 10 (9.9%) 
Partner 11 (10.9%) 
  
Number (percent) who had encountered fraud on an audit engagement  26 (25.7%) 
Mean number of frauds encountered 1.85 
  
Number (percent) with audit experience on construction industry clients 39 (38.6%) 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance: Effects of Client Narcissism and  
Fraud Motivation on Auditor Fraud Risk Assessments 
 
Panel A: ANOVA Model 
Source Type III SS df MS F Significance 
Model 20.119 3 6.706 6.919 < .001 
Client Narcissism (N) 16.176 1 16.176 16.689 <.001 
Fraud Motivation (M) 4.003 1 4.003 4.130 .045 
N  M .250 1 .250 .258 .613 
Error 94.019 97 .969   
Model adjusted R
2 
= .151 
 
 
Panel B: Treatment Means (Cell Frequencies) 
 
Low Narcissism High Narcissism Overall 
Low Motivation 
4.261 
(23) 
4.963 
(27) 
4.612 
(50) 
High Motivation 
4.560 
(25) 
5.462 
(26) 
5.011 
(51) 
Overall  
4.410 
(48) 
5.212 
(53) 
4.811 
(101) 
 
 
Responses to the audit fraud risk assessment measure were recorded on a seven-point scale with 
endpoints labeled 1 = “Very Low” and 7 = “Very High”. The midpoint of 4 was labeled 
“Moderate”.  
 
Narcissism and Motivation are client fraud risk factors, each manipulated between subjects at 
two levels (low and high). 
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APPENDIX: EXCERPTS FROM CASE INSTRUMENT 
(Low narcissism and low motivation version) 
 
Client Information  
Beaumont Construction Company (Beaumont) is a general contractor specializing in commercial 
and governmental construction projects. Beaumont provides demolition, site development, 
construction, and site management services on projects ranging from shopping centers and 
manufacturing facilities to railroads, pipelines, and other infrastructure projects. Beaumont’s 
government projects have historically been limited to smaller-scale contracts to install utility 
lines and build roads and bridges for counties and municipalities. However, the company has 
recently decided to pursue an aggressive growth strategy by bidding on large building and 
facility contracts for state, county, and municipal governments.  
 
Beaumont is privately held and has been a client of your firm for the past seven years. The com-
pany has approximately 1,200 employees and has offices in three states. For the fiscal year ended 
September 30, 2009, Beaumont reported revenues of $154.6 million and net income of $6.7 
million. 
 
Assume that it is now March 31, 2010, the end of the second quarter for the fiscal year ended 
September 30, 2010. Further assume that you were recently assigned to the audit of Beaumont’s 
2010 financial statements and that you will be responsible for the audit fieldwork on Beaumont’s 
Government Projects Group (GPG). Because this is your first year on the Beaumont engagement, 
you have spent some time researching the client, its operations, and its personnel. Some 
additional information about the Government Projects Group follows. 
 
GPG Personnel and Operations 
Michael Vance has been the General Manager of the GPG since January 2007. Michael, 34, is a 
CPA with eight years of experience prior to joining Beaumont, including three years at a Big 4 
audit firm and five years in various financial and management roles for a small construction 
company. Other staff members include three contract accountants, Steven Archuleta, Rose 
Dawson, and Frank Choi; David Williams, the contract supervisor; and Celia McWhorter, the 
group’s administrative assistant. 
 
Many GPG subcontractors work on multiple projects. Site managers report all labor and material 
costs directly to Beaumont’s corporate accounting department, which is responsible for recording 
the transaction details and updating the corporate general ledger. 
 
As part of your client risk assessment procedures, you recently met with Michael to gain an 
understanding of business processes within the GPG. The following specific exchanges occurred 
during your meeting.  
 
Because of the small size of the GPG staff, you inquired about its ability to meet deadlines. 
Michael replied: “The team has a history of stepping up when it counts to make sure things get 
done on time. I’ll give you an example. Our first quarter close this year was on a tight deadline. 
We got a little behind on getting subcontractor change orders processed, and we hadn’t 
29 
 
completed reconciling construction in progress [CIP] to the latest progress estimates. The team 
knew we had to get the change orders and CIP account detail in shape for closing, and everyone 
stayed late to get the job done. After things settled down, we had a meeting to go over our 
quarter-end procedures. The team came up with great suggestions to streamline the process and 
make it easier to meet deadlines in the future.” 
 
When you inquired about the best way for your staff auditors to obtain information from the 
GPG staff, Michael replied: “Feel free to ask anyone for whatever you need. We have a small 
staff, but it’s a good team that is familiar with the kinds of information auditors typically need. It 
will be a lot more efficient for you to talk to the individuals directly without having to clear it 
with me first.”  
 
GPG Contract and Financial Information  
A key strategy for Beaumont’s growth is to actively pursue large-scale government construction 
projects in the region. Historically, the GPG has worked on contracts with revenues of $5 million 
or less. During 2007 and 2008, the GPG bid on several large-dollar municipal contracts, but 
these bids were not accepted. Since then, Michael has intensified his efforts to secure large 
projects and has been aggressive in contract pricing and promoting Beaumont’s capabilities to 
complete projects on time and within budget. 
 
As the result of Michael’s increased efforts, the GPG secured its first large-scale construction 
contract in January 2009. The contract is with Beale County for its new Department of 
Transportation facility. The facility includes a three-story office complex, a large garage capable 
of housing 20 large trucks, and a maintenance facility with space for five vehicles. This project, 
with a contract price of $57 million and a budgeted profit of $9.69 million, represents a 
substantial percentage of Beaumont’s projected revenue and income for fiscal 2010. 
 
The Beale County contract called for the work to be completed in 18 months, with the county 
scheduled to take possession by October 1, 2010. The county will pay for unexpected costs due 
to increases in material, labor, or to changes in specifications. 
 
At present (March 31, 2010), the GPG had six projects active, including the Beale County 
project. A summary of the current contracts is shown in the following table.  
 
Beaumont Construction Company 
Government Projects Group 
Schedule of Current Contracts 
As of March 31, 2010 
Project Number Client Contract Price Estimated Profit 
1 Able County $5 million Cost plus at 18% 
2 Able County $3 million Cost plus at 18% 
3 City of Charlestown $4 million 16% 
4 Town of Perryville $2.5 million 18% 
5 Town of Springfield $0.9 million 20% 
6 Beale County $57 million 17% 
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In February 2009, Beaumont secured a $20 million construction loan from a local bank to 
purchase materials and pay for other up-front costs of the Beale County project. Groundbreaking 
was scheduled for March 2009. However, due to difficulties in leasing earthmoving equipment 
and bad weather, the project start was delayed by several weeks. Despite the company’s best 
efforts to get back on schedule, the Beale County project has continued to lag behind projected 
completion milestone dates during 2009 and into 2010. 
 
During your recent meeting with Michael Vance, he acknowledged that completion of the Beale 
County project by October 1, 2010 as required by the contract did not seem likely under the 
current schedule. At this point, the project may be able to be put back on schedule if additional 
construction work is completed on weekends. Scheduling labor on weekends would result in a 
cost overrun of $3 million, which is not recoverable as an unexpected labor cost per the contract. 
A cost overrun would reduce the gross profit by $3 million to $6.69 million (or about 11.7%—
Beaumont’s average gross profit is 17%). 
 
The decision regarding weekend construction work must be made in the next two weeks, or the 
project will fall further behind schedule without any hope of completion by October 1, 2010. 
 
 
Overall, I believe the risk of fraud in Beaumont’s Government Projects Group is: 
 
1……..…....2…..……....3……....…..4……….…..5……….…..6…..…..…..7 
              Very Low Moderate                      Very High 
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Without looking back at the case, please respond to each statement a through h below by writing 
in the space provided the number from the following scale (1 through 7) that most closely 
matches your belief for each statement. Use your best judgment based on your memory of the 
information in the case. 
 
Scale for Statements a through h 
1: Strongly Agree 
2: Agree 
3: Slightly Agree 
4: Neutral 
5: Slightly Disagree 
6: Disagree 
7: Strongly Disagree 
 
a. Michael Vance is competent. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
b. Michael Vance demands respect.  
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
c. Michael Vance is a team builder. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
d. Michael Vance has been successful in his career. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
e. Michael Vance has a high opinion of himself. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
f. Michael Vance is even-tempered. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
g. Michael Vance is assertive. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
h. Michael Vance is likable. 
Your Response (1 through 7): ______ 
 
 
 
